

DDI 2375-68

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22 August 1968

PERSONAL


MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT: Indications of Soviet Intent to Invade Czechoslovakia

1. As you know, one of the most difficult problems with which current intelligence analysts have to deal is reading through the clutter of possibly relevant reports to determine which ones, if any, are indicators of an imminent event of significance.

2. The recent events in Czechoslovakia again bring to our attention the importance of alerting our analysts and screeners to the need to bring to the attention of senior responsible intelligence officers all indicators bearing on the imminence of a major event that has already been postulated as a real and present possibility.

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4. Obviously [redacted] has more significance in hindsight than might have been expected to attach to it at the time it was received. However, in view of the circumstances we knew to then obtain in the Czech-Soviet situation, I think [redacted] should have at least been drawn to the attention of the Head of OCI. It may well be that even so it would have been argued that the report was not sufficiently significant

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to warrant serious consideration. The disturbing aspect is that it appears no opportunity to consider it at all was afforded to the senior intelligence officers responsible for the dissemination of current intelligence.

5. Please look into this and advise the Director and me what the actual circumstances were and what action you feel should be taken to minimize the chances of this sort of thing happening in the future.

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Rufus Taylor
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy
Deputy Director

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